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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to describe in detail how the capitalization of hatred can 
effectively be used as a political commodity, especially in terms of mass 
mobilization to intervene in government policies. By utilizing a 
theoretical approach of Cherian George, the author tries to analyze the 
campaign process and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, which 
involves a lot of practices of capitalization of hatred - especially by using 
religious narratives - so that it successfully raises negative views of 
certain social groups. This study proves that hatred capitalization has 
profoundly used to mobilize mass and suppress opposing group voters 
so that individual candidates can achieve a political gain in the election. 
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ABSTRAK 
Tulisan ini ingin menjelaskan secara detail bagaimana kapitalisasi 
kebencian secara efektif dapat digunakan sebagai komoditas politik. 
Khususnya dalam hal memobilisasi massa, guna mengintervensi 
kebijakan pemerintah. Dengan mengadopsi pendekatan yang 
digunakan oleh Cherian George, penulis mencoba menganalisis 
bagaimana proses kampanye dan pemilihan Gubernur DKI Jakarta 
tahun 2017, yang banyak  melibatkan praktik-praktik kapitalisasi 
kebencian  –khususnya dengan menggunakan narasi agama–  sehingga 
berhasil memunculkan pandangan negatif masyarakat kepada 
kelompok tertentu. Dan bahkan terbukti mampu dijadikan ‘modal’ 
untuk memobilisasi massa –demi menekan kelompok lawan– sehingga 
kandidat tertentu dapat mencapai keuntungan politik, dari kapitalisasi 
kebencian tersebut. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of hatred (especially in its manifestations as hate speech) has been widely carried out. 
Hatred is seen as a social phenomenon in society, which can increase further into a violation of the laws 
governing hate crime. There are various studies on hate speech and freedom of speech, especially in the 
context of democracy (Tsesis, 2009); hatred and hate speech relations with human rights (Rosenfeld, 2002), 
issues of minority rights (Johnson & Byers, 2003);  the spread of hate speech on the internet, or cyber-hate   
(Burnap & Williams, 2015 ; Warner & Hirschberg, 2012; Chetty & Alathur, 2018), policing hate-crime 
(Perry, 2010; Mason et al., 2017), and so on. 
Hatred can also be seen as a political commodity, namely to mobilize collective action (George, 
2016: 2956). Hate propaganda can be a deliberate strategy, not just a spontaneous spark that occurs 
randomly. George proposes the term "hate-spin," which is defined as "a two-pronged political strategy of 
verification or manufactured use as a means of mobilizing supporters and coercing opponents" (George, 
2016: 2957). Hate spin can apply in the context of differences in religion, race, language, nationality, 
immigrant status, and other symbols of social identity. 
In this paper, the same perspective is used to explain how hatred is capitalized as a political 
modality to move the masses. Explicitly, it will be taught how the capitalization of hatred develops in the 
case of the (Special Capital Region) Daerah Khusus Ibukota (DKI) Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2017. The 
series of events stemmed from an official video speech by governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, (BTP) who 
was also a candidate to compete in the election, when he spoke in front of the Seribu Island residents on 
September 27, 2016. The activity was covered and recorded by the DKI Jakarta Communication and 
Information Services (Kominfomas) and was published on the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government's 
YouTube account. At first, there was no prominent public reaction. But after an edited video that 
decapitated some of the contents of the video section, several significant mass actions took place in Jakarta. 
The edited video resulted in a violent public outcry against actions that were considered an insult to Islam. 
Repeated public pressure occurred, and amplified with massive attacks through social media, ultimately 
making BTP's popularity useless to help him win the governor's seat. 
Public pressure increased and further reinforced by MUI's statement, which was signed by the 
General Chairperson Dr. KH. Ma'ruf Amin and Secretary General of the MUI Dr. H. Anwar Abbas on 
October 11, 2016. This verdict essentially stated that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's statement was categorized 
as: (1) insulting the Quran and or (2) insulting the ulama, and therefore was considered subject to legal 
consequences. However, the Special Capital Region of Jakarta Election Commission on October 22, 2016, 
consented the pair involving BTP and Djarot Saiful Hidayat as the candidates for the Special Capital 
Region of Jakarta governor, who were going to compete against Anies-Sandiaga and Agus-Sylvi. What is 
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more, the demand for processing BTP-related issues as a contender for Islam led to massive mass 
demonstrations on October 14, 2016, November 4, 2016 (Action 411), and December 2, 2016 (Action 212), 
each of which was known as the Action of Defending Islam. Continuous and problematic pressures that 
arose during the trial process made it difficult for BTP voters to support him, eventually made him 
electability sink despite public satisfaction with relatively high performance under his reign. In the end, 
BTP lost the case, and the winner of the 2017 Special Capital Region of Jakarta election, subsequently 
serving as Governor and Deputy Governor were Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga S. Uno. A few months 
later, the verdict against BTP was adjourned on May 9, 2017, where he was found guilty and had to serve 
a 2-year prison sentence. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This paper is based on a literature review providing the theoretical framework that explains and 
analyzes how hatred is capitalized as a political modality, primarily through social media, so that it 
successfully moves the masses to achieve specific political goals. Hatred capitalization in the case of the 
2017 Governor of DKI Jakarta election is seen as a series of continuous events, namely starting from the 
text (the edited video), that reproduced repeatedly and amplified through social media so that it becomes 
a mass movement. The theoretical framework at work is based on the theory of Hate Pyramid, as stated 
by Jubany (2016). It accounts for the process of capitalization of hatred driven by political motives 
concerning the concept of hate-spin (George, 2016; 2017). 
Figure 1. The Pyramid of Hatred 
Source: Jubany, O. (2016). Backgrounds, Experiences and Responses to Online Hate Speech: An 
Ethnographic Multi-sited Analysis. 2nd Annual International Conference on Social Science and 
Contemporary Humanity Development 
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Jubany (2016) proposes a pyramid model to illustrate how "psychology of hate" can develop, 
starting with the bias of views such as stereotype, jokes, vocabulary that is not inclusive, and so on. 
Furthermore, a preference grows into the prejudice that manifests itself in such actions as bullying, 
intimidation, giving bad nicknames, separating socially, and so on. At a higher level, individual actions 
can transform into an institutionalization in society, resulting in discrimination in various fields. Finally, 
at a more severe level, there will be bias-motivated violence, which culminates in the effort to get rid of or 
even destroy different parties (genocide). 
Also, the study also delves into the impact of using information technology in spreading hatred 
through cyberspace. The advancement of information technology today provides a new context in which 
hatred gets a wider space with massive dissemination. Information technology enables hate speech 
metamorphosed into cyber-hate, which is a special form of hatred that is packaged and disseminated 
through cyber space. Cyber-hate is defined as "the use of electronic communications technology to spread 
anti-semiotic, racist, bigoted, extremist or terrorist messages or information. These electronic 
communications technologies include “the Internet (i.e. websites, social networking sites, Web 2.0 user-
generated content, dating sites, blogs, and online games, instant messages, and e-mail) as well as other 
computer - and cell phone-based information technologies (text messages and mobile phones)” (ADL, 
2014). Development of web technology 2:0 has allowed individuals’ autonomy to produce their own 
content and disseminate it to a wide audience. Social media can also be manipulated as a tool to spread 
hatred, propaganda and victimization. Through the internet, the ideas of violence can be spread, and 
recruitment of radical groups can be done more easily. 
Figure 2. Capitalization of Hatred and Mass Mobilization 
The framework of this study (Figure 2) aims to portray the process of BTP’s speech controversy, 
which is analyzed through CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) and how amplification occurs through 
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internet media, which mutually reinforces with mass mobilization taking place in the real world. Through 
this framework, the researchers strive to illustrate how the capitalization of hatred takes place in this case. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
The method used in this research is the CDA framework, developed by Norman Fairclough (1989), 
to guide analysis of hate-speech as a social phenomenon. According to Fairclough (1989), the CDA 
assumes that language is an integral part of social life, interconnected with other elements of social life. 
As such, discourse analysis must take into account issues beyond mere language concerns. This view 
implies the following notions: (1) discourse cannot be separated from society; (2) discussion is a social 
process, and (3) the discursive process depends on what is conditioned in society. 
Discourse analysis is primarily intended to reveal the use of language, how discursive practices 
are developed, and their relation to social practices referred to by a discourse. CDA emphasizes a critical 
approach, where the focus lies on a problem or "social irregularity" found in society. CDA intends to 
display the phenomenon of social inequality so that it can be discussed as a scientific discourse. 
Technically, Fairclough (2010: 226) explains that the CDA approach consists of four stages: (1) focusing on 
social irregularities in its semiotic aspects; (2) identifying the obstacles to overcoming social 
inconsistencies; (3) considering whether the social order "requires" social aberrations; and (4) identifying 
possible ways to overcome the barriers or to overcome problems. Concerning CDA perspective, hatred 
can be seen as a social phenomenon which always involves a linguistic or semiotic aspect and describes 
how language is used in social practice. At the same time, the discursive practice also explains how social 
irregularities emerge as a contestation of interests entrenched within a social space.   
FINDINGS 
1. Hatred as A Social Irregularity 
The first stage of CDA is to establish a focus on a "social irregularity" seen from its semiotics. 
According to Haryatmoko (2017:19-20), irregularities are perceived as "the aspects of the social system, 
forms, and structures that are detrimental to shared prosperity and can be improved even though it must 
go through radical changes from the system." Some examples of social irregularities include poverty, 
inequality, discrimination, and lack of freedom or racism. In this study, the common aberration in question 
is the development of hatred (hatred) as a social phenomenon in society. 
In this first stage, semiotic analysis of social irregularities is carried out through four steps: (1) 
vocabulary analysis or vocabulary and the use of terms; (2) analyzing the use of metaphors; (3) analyzing 
the structure of the text with the logic of its argument; and (4) analyzing grammatical and textual cohesion. 
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To reveal how hatred is developed as a means of mass mobilization in the case of Jakarta Election 
2017, the researcher refers to the transcript of the original BTP’s speech. The total expression is 1 hour, 48 
minutes, 22 seconds long, and consists of 89 sentences. This text is then compared with the controversial 
fragment uploaded by Buni Yani. That piece of speech has triggered pros and cons, and it further has 
ignited a reaction in the form of mass mobilization in a series of religiously motivated demonstrations. 
At the vocabulary level, the vocabulary included in the original speech includes: "cultivation", "sea 
as wealth", "Seribu Island close to Jakarta (as a market)", "ship", "planting banana", "chicken poultry", 
"Planting Moringa leaves is also possible", "the group is only for friendship", "cooperative", "profit sharing 
80:20", "must be diligent and honest", "KJP (Smart Jakarta Card)", "human development index", "ship 
transportation subsidies"," bad PNS", "DKI civil servants’ salaries","budget","program (grouper 
aquaculture)","regional election","buying cats in sacks", lied using Al Maidah verse 51", and "debt of 
gratitude". Overall the vocabulary used is a daily vocabulary that is easily understood by lay people. The 
purpose of the speech was to explain the aquaculture program to the Seribu Island fishermen groups, 
although there is an explanation of the political contestation of the DKI Regional Election that will be held 
shortly, namely planned in early 2017.  
The metaphorical analysis shows that BTP's speech includes various metaphors, which can be 
grouped as follows: (1) metaphor referring to "economic empowerment" and "government programs"; and 
(2) "political" metaphor, namely BTP's comments on upcoming governor elections. 
The structure of BTP’s speech is shown in Table 1. The address can be divided into twelve parts, 
including the opening and closing. 
Table 1. The Structure of BTP’s Speech 
No Topics 
Sentence 
number 
The number 
of sentences 
1 Opening 1-2 2 
2 Comparison between Seribu Island and 
Belitung, which is the birthplace of BTP 
3-13 11 
3 Economic empowerment through the 
cultivation of poultry 
14-18 5 
4 Economic empowerment through ship 
assistance and changes to the Raskin program 
(poor rice) 
19-23 5 
5 About DKI Jakarta regional election, 
especially choosing the best candidate based 
on performance 
24-32 9 
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6 Explanation of ponds, namely grouper 
cultivation programs 
33-47 15 
7 Economic prospects of the Seribu Island in the 
future 
48-52 5 
8 About the development of human resources 
in DKI Jakarta through education and health 
53-62 10 
9 Ship transportation program to spur the 
economy of the Seribu Island 
63-70 8 
10 The performance of local government officials 
(PNS) must be good. If there is corruption, it 
must be reported immediately and will be 
fired 
71-78 8 
11 About DKI Election, including fragments of 
speeches that are considered controversial 
79-88 10 
12 Closing 89 1 
 Total  89 
 
The structure of the speech above highlights two things. First, the part pertinent to talks about the 
DKI Pilkada is in two fragments, namely sentence numbers 24-32 (9 sentences) and sentence numbers 78-
88 (10 sentences), comprising of 19 sentences. In both sections, BTP spoke about the importance of vision 
and mission as well as programs, coupled with performance and track record as criteria for choosing 
leaders. 
Second, the section uploaded by Buni Yani, which became controversial, was in the second 
fragment, namely sentence number 82-84 (three sentences). In full article, the speech in the video uploaded 
by Buni Yani is as follows: 
"(82) So, don't trust people easily. It is very likely that beneath your heart lies the willingness not 
to vote for me, mainly because you are deceived by Surah Al Maidah verse 51 and stuff, you know. 
You have the rights to make your choice. (83) Yes, so if you feel that you can't vote for me, because 
you are afraid of going to hell, being fooled like that, it's OK. This is your conscience. This program 
will proceed. (84). OK! Say you don't need to feel sorry in your conscience simply because you can't 
vote for Ahok, or you don't like Ahok, but you want the program. If you take the chance, you may 
feel sorry for me, or say you owe me. Please, don't even think about it. If you don't feel right, you 
will die slowly, you know, because of stroke. " 
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The brevity of video fragments are then scattered, adding a caption in the form of removing the 
word "use" before the word "Surah Al-Maidah 51", and adding the word "Muslim voter" in parentheses, 
which are not in the original text, namely as follows: 
"RELIGION BLASPHEMY? Ladies and gentlemen (Muslim voters) ... you are deceived by Al-
Maidah verse 51 "....... (and)" you will go to hell "(Ladies and gentlemen) you are also fooled" ...... 
It seems that something terrible will happen with this video ". 
The dissemination of the videos and transcripts which did not match the original speech was what 
subsequently triggered the public emotions so that they placed BTP as a "religious deterrent" and 
demanded immediate law acts. These included several mass mobilizations on a large scale to pressure the 
law enforcement officials, to sentence BTP. 
Furthermore, the grammatical analysis focused on how clauses and sentences are used in a text. In 
BTP's speech, the sentences used were a picture of everyday conversation, according to the type of speech 
including no book which tended to be sung casually. This can be seen from the use of non-standard 
grammar. For example, "(2) if I go to Pulau Seribu, I say I still remember my village". In formal grammar, 
this sentence might read: "every time to Pulau Seribu, I always remember the village (page)." 
The logic of the argumentation in the speech was started from BTP’s explanation about the 
economic potential of the sea from the Seribu Island and its proximity to the consumers of DKI Jakarta, 
which was quite extensive. According to BTP, there were two obstacles to actualizing this potential: (1) 
the use of capture fishermen techniques which was no longer economical, because over-fishing has 
occurred, so fishermen must be directed to cultivation techniques; and (2) the production of aquaculture 
which calls forth sea transportation (ships) to transport goods to markets in Jakarta. Therefore, he 
proceeded with an explanation of economic empowerment through cultivation, which put forward not 
only aquaculture through ponds (as well as programs being discussed in speeches) but also other types of 
civilization such as poultry and agriculture. BTP also added the economic potential of Seribu Island in the 
future, including in the tourism sector. Afterward, he moved on to explaining DKI Jakarta Provincial 
Government program in the fields of education and health. This segment involved nine sentences about 
choosing leaders, concerning the 2017 DKI Regional Election, namely sentences 24-32. By the end of his 
speech, BTP explained the performance of DKI Provincial Government Civil Servants, who had already 
received high salaries so they should not commit corruption again. He then again repeated the details 
concerning DKI Jakarta regional election, before the speech was closed with greetings.  
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The logic behind the argument compiled in the text structure above conclude that the 
(controversial) explanation about Al Maidah verse 51 is only an insertion or interlude of speeches, due to 
the accidental speech delivered before the contestation of the elections. The relevance is that whatever the 
people's choice regarding the future governor, BTP wants to ensure that the empowerment program 
through aquaculture is sure to continue. 
Through this first stage of CDA, it is clear that semiotically BTP's original speech is characterized 
by neutral discourse, focusing on the problem of economic empowerment of fishing communities, instead 
of being anchored to provoking controversy about religious issues. Indeed, there are two parts of the 
speech where BTP is slightly deviant, alluding to the DKI Election, although it is still in the context of 
reminding the public to be wise upon voting. The speech became a controversy in the second part when 
BTP referred to "Surah Al Maidah," as a reference to explain the politicization of religion. 
However, BTP's concern about the issue of politicization of religion is not the first time is not anew; 
it has existed for a while. In detail, he explained his experience as follows. 
"During my political career where I registered myself as a new party member, became branch 
leader, gained the verification to participate in elections, won the recent election campaigns and 
even succeeded in the governor election, there was a similar verse, which to my knowledge, had 
been used to divide the people in order to scoop victories by those possessed by "the spirit of 
colonialism. Elite elements deliberately spread the verse because it could not compete with its 
vision, mission, program, and personal integrity. They tried to take refuge behind the holy verses 
so that the people with the concept of "faith" chose him. 
From the elite who took refuges behind the holy verses of Islam, they used Surah Al Maidah verse 
51. It provoked the public not to vote for Christians and Jews to be their leaders, with the addition 
of never choosing infidels to be leaders. The point is that they are invited to choose leaders from 
the same religion. "(BTP, 2008:40) 
For BTP, the politicization of religions is considered unfair because the community ultimately 
chooses leaders not because of achievements or track records, but solely because of shared beliefs, which 
does not fit into the context of a democratic and pluralistic country such as Indonesia. However, BTP did 
not specifically blame individuals from the Islamic religion. According to him, similar people also exist in 
Christianity, and perhaps in some other religions. 
"What about the elite who take refuge behind the Christian scriptures? They use the verse in 
Galatians 6:10. Its contents, as long as we still have the opportunity, let us do decent things to 
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everyone, but especially to our friends in the faith. I don't know what is used by elites in Bali who 
are Hindus or Buddhists. But I believe that, without question, people are preached not to choose 
people from other religions or other tribes, especially those with other races. In essence, it is 
imperative to choose those who are fellow believers/neighbors (ethnicity, race, religion, and 
between groups). "(BTP, 2008:41). 
It turned out that BTP's intention to clarify the issue of religious politicization in his speech, 
especially in the context of nominating himself as a candidate in the 2017 Jakarta Election, was precisely 
the trigger of hot political controversy. After the speech recording was cut, given a caption, and published 
by Buni Yani in the Facebook account, the modified video went viral in the community. This indirectly 
shows "social irregularities" in the city, echoing the ideas that the problems of politicizing religion are still 
a sensitive issue. This is a crucial problem, considering that the Indonesian people are pluralist 
communities and refer to democratic values in their political life. In this context, the study also reveals 
that the phenomenon of "hatred" in society can be triggered by differences in religion, race, ethnicity, and 
between groups, which are hidden in the language of "blasphemy" as used by Buni Yani and used in the 
mass mobilization that followed. 
2. The Obstacles to Social Irregularities 
The social order behind this case can be analyzed from the existence of two different "ideologies" 
among Muslims themselves. The difference in interpretation of BTP's speech can be seen as two different 
ideological views about the role of Islam in politics, especially in Indonesia. On the one hand, some groups 
want Islam to be formally recognized and get a place in politics. On the other hand, there are groups 
which assume that Islam does not need to be represented officially in politics, but rather in its substantive 
aspects. The political-formal group in the case of BTP's speech succeeded in gaining a superior position 
because mobilization and mass pressure on this case was finally formalized as the MUI's Statement of 
Attitude 11 October 2016, which justified their position. Discourse battles between the two camps did not 
take place quickly, but these were laden with debates and controversies driven by their opinions and 
attitudes.  
The strengthening can see the "victory" of the Islamic-formalistic group of discourses such as 
"Action of Defending Islam," "Movement 212", "Mujahid," etc., which was supported by the power of 
social media and the internet. Driven by, among others, a group that calls itself "Muslim Cyber Army 
(MCA) ", the discourse is spread through social media such as Facebook and Whatsapp groups, as well as 
internet news sites such as Saracen News, Saracen Cyber Team, Saracennews.com, and various other 
groups to attract netizens' interest to partake in the initiative. The dissemination of content echoing the 
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opinions to capture and prosecute BTP took place not only through cyberspace but also was amplified by 
a series of actions and mass mobilization. The mass mobilization was commandeered by a group called 
the GNPF-MUI (National Movement to Safeguard the Indonesian Ulema Council's Fatwa), with one of 
the initiators being Rizieq Shihab who was the leader of the FPI. He was also known to oppose the idea 
of BTP being appointed as DKI governor. 
As these formalistic Islamic groups gained more power, hostility, and hatred towards different 
groups or groups gain their traction in the discourse of political contestation. Hate as a "social irregularity" 
seems to be obligatory to these groups to win their position and interests. One example was the strategy 
of "imprisoning BTP" through the mistakes he made in the speech, which failed in reducing BTP 
electability. However, the price that must be paid in the long term may be quite high, comprising of 
decreased tolerance in society, the possibility of social segregation, the potential for polarization and 
conflict, discrimination against citizens' rights, and the scarcity of democratic maturity at the local level. 
3. Possible Ways to Deal with Social Irregularities  
Prevention of hatred in society is a complicated matter because the causative factors can be 
multilayered, as shown by the hatred pyramid theory proposed by Jubany (Figure 1). Hatred must be 
seen as an accumulative process that stems from bias towards different people or groups of people, both 
in the form of stereotypes, insensitive expressions, degrading jokes, non-inclusive languages, and so on. 
If it can be nurtured and embedded within the individual level, it will give rise to prejudice actions, which 
can then develop into various forms of discrimination, be it political discrimination, economic 
discrimination, employment discrimination, housing discrimination, and so on. Discrimination does not 
occur at the individual level anymore, but rather at the group level. These discriminations can lead to 
violence that is motivated by bias-motivated force, namely in the form of murder, rape, assault, arson, 
terrorism, vandalism, and others. 
Therefore, the solution to overcome hatred as social irregularities can be applied in stages. 
Prevention should have started from the beginning, namely to prevent inter-group bias and the existence 
of prejudices that arise at the individual level. Facilities that can be used include school education, family 
education, work environment, mass media, and other social interactions. If hatred has reached the group 
level, which is manifested in various forms of discrimination, prevention will be more sophisticated. The 
case of contempt that developed in the context of the 2017 DKI Jakarta Pilkada, as discussed in this study, 
tended to result in discrimination, namely political discrimination. 
Furthermore, the phenomenon laden with the controversy in the case of BTP’s speech contains 
references to religious groupings that occur among Muslims themselves. As mentioned above, Muslims 
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in Indonesia can be grouped into two groups, namely Islam-substantive and Islam-formalistic. If we see 
the contrast between the differences in the views of the two groups, especially concerning the position of 
Islam in politics, it seems challenging to bridge both parties. This difference of opinion is one of the factors 
developing intolerance and hatred in society, which is triggered by political contestation. There is a 
common interest between these two groups, namely fighting for Islamic values in social life. This is 
realized, among others, in the following matters. First, this common objective aims to improve the quality 
of Islamic human resources, through formal education, training, and other general learning assisted by 
media, such as mass media. It must be admitted that the level of education among Muslims in Indonesia 
is still low, making it a common problem, both for Islam-substantive and Islamic-formalistic groups. 
Second, the commonality is geared to improving the public economy, namely the potential of economic 
resources never been optimally explored so far. Third, it also deals with responding to modernity as a 
necessity that must be faced by Muslims. How Muslims enter modernity while maintaining their 
traditions and beliefs is a question that both groups take into account, although each tends to come up 
with a different answer. Islam-substantive groups tend to be open, inclusive, and consider the modern 
world as a foe. On the contrary, Islamic-formalistic groups tend to look for solutions that are self-closing, 
exclusive and consider the contemporary world as a threat to diversity itself. 
These same interests should strive towards empowering Muslims to focus on productive issues, so 
they are not trapped in short-term investments. In reality, to date, such similarities of interests have not 
succeeded in bringing the views between the two different groups together. In the long run, approaches, 
discussions, and dialogue between the two groups are needed, to establish a solid basis for dealing with 
things such as radicalism, intolerance, terrorism, hate speech, and other forms of hate issues as discussed 
in this study. 
DISCUSSION  
This study has shown that the controversy surrounding BTP's speech was sparked by a statement, 
which was then edited and given framing by others and published on social media and subsequently 
became viral. As a result, the resultant segment aroused emotional reactions from several Muslim parties. 
Various groups then mobilized the masses in a series of demonstrations, to affirm the image of BTP as a 
"religious deterrent" while demanding that a legal process be carried out immediately against him. 
However, through CDA, it can be seen what behind this series of events, there is a process of capitalization 
of hatred aimed at winning other candidates in the 2017 Jakarta election. 
The results of the study are in harmony with research by George (2016), mainly concerned with 
the concept of hate-spin. This concept demonstrates that inter-group hatred in society can be triggered by 
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offense engineering, and it can be subsequently used to mobilize support and suppress opponents in 
politics. The image of BTP as a "religious oppressor" can be seen what a hate-spin process because the real 
purpose is to defeat the person involved in the contestation of the governor's election. The difference is 
that the hate-spin concept emphasizes political strategies that use hate propaganda as one of the tools. 
Meanwhile, this research views hatred as a process of social interaction in society, which can be analyzed 
through the linguistic aspect, namely CDA. 
This study also confirms Whitten's research (2018), which also sees the aspects of language as a 
reference in analyzing hate phenomena. The difference is that Whitten examines the dangers posed by 
hate propaganda as effects that are not only direct, illocutionary forces of action, but also influenced by 
background and intersubjective relationships, thus explaining the impact of hate speech as experienced 
from the perspective of the first person. Meanwhile, this research does not emphasize individual 
psychology but focuses on hatred as a social phenomenon which in certain situations can be politicized 
for specific purposes.  
In the same vein, the research is in congruence with Deveci and Kınık’s work (2018), which 
examines nationalist bias in the discourse of handling law against speeches of hatred in Turkey. Their 
study analyzes the murder case of Hrant Dink, a minority Armenian Turkish journalist. The study 
concluded that Turkish courts tended to alleviate or not punish those who expressed hate speech to the 
extent that the statement was consistent with nationalist doctrine. The same thing was seen in BTP case, 
in which minorities tended to experience discriminatory treatment in the context of hate speech. In court, 
BTP was sentenced to 2 years in prison with blasphemy article, among others, due to the public pressure 
which put forward the majority identity. The difference is that the Hrant Dink case has developed into 
physical violence, even deaths, whereas in the case of BTP, it has only reached the level of (political) 
discrimination.     
CONCLUSION  
Hatred, as a political tool, especially deployed to mobilize collective action, has been put forward 
by George (2016), namely through the concept of "hate-spin." Hatred can be manipulated and twisted to 
gain a political advantage, either directly or indirectly, and can serve as the politicization of perpetrators 
and victims of the giving or taking of offense as a political strategy. Theoretical analysis in this paper 
departs from the same view, presuming that hatred in society can develop into a political tool to defeat 
opponents, or to promote particular interest.  
The research findings signify a complex process in which texts, contexts, discourse practices, and 
social practices are interconnected to build hatred in society to accrue certain political benefits in the 
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electoral context. This finding reinforces that hatred is not merely perceived as a legal problem, which, 
among other things, is regulated through regulations regarding the utterance of hatred and hate crimes. 
Instead, it also denotes a social phenomenon that can emerge from small matters, such as bias and 
prejudice at the individual level, which can develop into discrimination or even violence involving 
numerous parties. 
In the context of a multi-cultural society of Indonesia, early education needs to instill values of 
tolerance and harmony. Hatred stemming from bias and prejudice may give rise to discriminatory 
behaviors towards different parties. Therefore, it is crucial to instill these values as early as possible, to 
eliminate prejudice and discrimination, which may result from the differences in religion, ethnicity, 
language, and culture. Also, social interactions in the community must be prevented from being 
discriminatory, socially segregative, and susceptible to nullifying tolerance and harmony, in the context 
of formal and informal social relations. The goal is that the phenomenon of "hatred" remains non-existent 
to prevent it from threatening the social and national integrity. 
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